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This study estimates the impact of the gender of informed individuals on agricultural training participation. 
To do so, we randomly distributed information about a rice planting demonstration to husbands or wives 
in rural Zambia. The results show that information recipients were much more likely to join the training 
than the non-recipients from the same household, indicating that information does not flow well among 
spouses. We present evidence that information sharing is distorted by intra-household differences in 
management rights over productive lands for rice cultivation. 
 
 
 
 
Key words: knowledge diffusion, intra-household bargaining, sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
1 Kyoto University 
2 National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) 
3 The University of Tokyo 
*Corresponding author: miura.ken.3e@kyoto-u.ac.jp 
 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The low adoption of profitable agricultural technologies and techniques is common in rural areas in 
Africa. The extant literature identifies a lack of knowledge about a technology’s existence, use, and 
benefits as one of prevailing barriers to its usage (Magruder 2018). Reflecting this view, current policy 
debates revolve around how to effectively spread relevant and accurate information on technology among 
farmers. The traditional approach to transmitting information leverages the existing social networks of 
farm households. In practice, agricultural programs generally target household heads, who are usually 
male farmers, partly reflected by the view that the females in male-headed households have little power 
to make decisions. In addition, the fact that the public extension agents are predominantly males may put 
females further at a disadvantage (Kondylis et al. 2016). This indicates that female farmers would have 
limited opportunities to acquire knowledge about recommended agricultural practices in the current 
extension system (BenYishay et al. 2020). 
However, African women devote the same time with their husbands to farming activities. Furthermore, 
they often have an independent authority to manage plots and make agricultural decisions, reflecting local 
cultural practices. If female farmers’ participation in opportunities to learn profitable techniques is 
restricted by information barriers under the conventional male-dominated program, the direct information 
delivery to women would have productivity consequences and implications for African agriculture. 
  This study assesses the importance of intra-household sharing of information about agricultural training 
in actual participation. Theoretical predictions depend on how we model households. According to the 
unitary model, the identity of information recipients should not matter, since all the decision-relevant 
information translates to common knowledge within marriage. As a result, the best member who benefits 
from the training will appear. In practice, however, each family member with different preferences and 
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resource constraints is involved in the household decision-making process. The model with the nature of 
collective decision suggests the possibility of incomplete information sharing within the household 
because the information useful for one of the spouses would not be so for the other. Rather, passing 
information to the spouse may backfire in the future if he/she increases their productivity through training, 
thereby improving their bargaining position in the household. 
This study tests this possibility with data from the rural parts of Zambia, where many suitable lands for 
rice production are left unexploited. To quantify the actual demand for rice cultivation, we conducted a 
demand experiment on upland rice seeds for production in October 2018 (Miura, Kijima and Sakurai 
2020). In fact, rice seed demand was found to be low among the sampled farmers with little prior 
experience in its cultivation. In addition, many purchase households did not plant rice seeds during the 
2018/19 crop season. According to the farmers, their main reason was a lack of managerial know-how 
about rice cultivation. To solve their information constraints, we offered simple training sessions on rice 
planting in November 2019. In doing so, we randomized the gender of the recipient who is informed about 
the training that is open for everyone in the village to measure the extent of information sharing within 
the household. We divided the sample into three groups: a group of households in which the wife receives 
the information about the training, a group of households in which the husband receives the information, 
and a control group of households in which no information was given. We exploit this experimental 
variation to estimate the impact of who receives the information within the household on the likelihood 
of training participation.  
Results show evidence of incomplete information sharing among spouses. Our intention-to-treat 
estimates show that information recipients are more likely to come to join the training irrespective of 
purchase history and their gender, even though the letter clearly mentions that his/her spouse also can join 
the event. Intra-household information spillovers were detected among purchase households only when 
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the information was given to the wife who manages plots suitable for rice. In that case, some husbands 
joined the training session. Such spillovers were not observed for non-purchase households. 
  This study is one of the first to investigate the possibility of incomplete information flow within 
households. While the literature underlines the salience of peers as a credible source of information, 
previous studies rarely addressed the role of spouses. Magnan et al. (2015) is a notable complementary 
study; they described existing intra-household differences in network links and estimated their 
differentiated effects on demand for a water management technique. Conversely, our study focuses on 
spousal differences in management rights over lands as an impediment to information circulation within 
the household.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting and our 
experimental design. While Section 3 provides the main results, Section 4 explores the mechanism behind 
the key finding. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Context and Experimental Design 
  1) Experimental Context 
  Our survey area is in the Masaiti District of Copperbelt Province, Zambia. People’s livelihoods depend 
mainly on rain-fed agriculture, and the major crops for cultivation are maize, cassava, rape and groundnuts. 
This district features shallow wetlands, which are inundated during the rainy season and become arid by 
the end of the dry season but retain some moisture through the season, locally referred to as dambo. Field 
observations found that many dambo lands were left unexploited. The main reason for this low utilization 
is that maize is not the best crop to plant on dambo, and no alternative crops are suitable for growing 
during the rainy season. Taking advantage of the remaining moisture in their soils, only a few farmers 
grow vegetables on dambo during the dry season. Hence, making full use of unexploited dambo fields 
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could create alternative income sources.  
  Candidates include rice, such as New Rice for Africa (NERICA) variety, which is suitable for the 
African environment. The dissemination of rice cultivation will benefit people’s livelihoods in many ways 
since rice will provide them with a new cash-earning opportunity and contribute to their diet. However, 
rice seeds for production were not available in the local markets. Therefore, we introduced NERICA rice 
seeds (NERICA 4) to local farmers with little prior experience in its cultivation in 2018.  
  To conduct a demand experiment involving NERICA, we randomly selected 40 villages among the 60 
villages in which a community survey had been conducted before. From each village, we randomly 
selected approximately 60% of the households to form our sample. Our survey team collected baseline 
information from 621 households in July and August 2018. Among them, 532 households were invited to 
rice sales meetings in October 2018. A total of 155 households (about 30%) purchased rice seeds, and the 
average purchase amount conditional on take-up was 2.6 kilograms. We then observed that only 34 
purchase households planted rice in the 2018/19 agricultural season. According to the sampled farmers, 
the main reason was a lack of working knowledge about its cultivation.1 ) We provided 621 original 
households another chance to buy seeds in June 2019, but only 51 households purchased it partly because 
interested farmers still kept rice seeds from the last purchase. 
  2) Experiments 
To alleviate informational deficiencies, we offered 1-hour training sessions by enumerators and camp 
extension officers in November 2019. Therefore, we selected 17 demonstration sites for every 3 to 4 
villages in August 2019. The session demonstrated rice planting and explained basic information about 
weeding and harvesting. Approximately 2 weeks before scheduled training dates, we informed the 
sampled households of the event with the letter describing when and where the training would be 
                                                          
1) At the baseline survey, basic information on rice cultivation was explained with a brochure to all the interviewed 
farmers.  
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happening. The letter also described that any household member could join the event.  
To investigate the extent to which information flows within the household, we randomly changed how 
the letter was delivered. Our experimental sample comprised 621 original households.2) The design began 
with stratification based on purchase history. Among 190 households that have purchased rice seeds from 
us at least once, 156 households belonged to married couples.3)  For these households, we attempted to 
deliver the letter to the wife for randomly selected 79 households (TW_P) and to the husband for the 
remaining 77 households (TH_P). Among the 431 non-purchase households, 303 households belonged to 
couples. We randomly divided them equally into (1) a treatment group of households in which the wife 
received the letter (TW_NP), (2) a treatment group of households in which the husband received it 
(TH_NP), or (3) a control group of households that received no information (C_NP). 
Our enumerators have tried to deliver the letter to the assigned recipients as much as they can for the 
last 2 weeks of October 2019, although we allowed them to leave it with their spouses and neighbors if 
they were not available. The overall compliance rate was 67.0%. Given this imperfect compliance with 
the treatment, we will focus on intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates in the regression analysis.4) 
  As baseline characteristics, we used information from the baseline survey conducted in July and August 
2018. The survey questionnaire consisted of two sections. The first part collected household-level 
information, such as demographics and asset ownership. The second part of interviews about individual-
specific information was conducted separately with household heads and their spouses in turn in isolation 
from others. At the end of the interview, they were separately asked whether one would like to buy rice 
seeds at a given price and if so how many kilograms would be purchased. 
                                                          
2 ) Although a few households had already been shifted before our intervention in 2019, we just maintained initial 
households to get around the non-random assignment of treatment. 
3) The remaining 34 were single households and so we did not use them for the analysis in this paper.  
4) Out of our 358 treatment households, the letter was given to the spouse for 31 households, to other family members 
for 35 households, and to neighbors for 40 households. 12 households were absent because of migration. If such non-
compliers are systematically different in unobservable ways, then the local average treatment estimates will not be a 
consistent estimator of the average treatment effect. 
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This study focuses on 442 married couples with complete information as our analysis sample. Table 1 
shows the balance of observable houeshold and spousal characteristics across the treatment arms for the 
purchase households. Statistically significant differences were detected at the 5% level for three out of 
the 19 variables examined here. Randomization was done by computer, and these just emerged by chance. 
Nevertheless, we control for these covariates in the regression to assure the orthogonality of the treatment 
assignments. Table 2 reports the same baseline characteristics for the non-purchase households, indicating 
that the randomization created fairly comparable groups. 
 
3．Estimation Models and Results 
  1) Empirical specifications 
  We estimate the impact of the gender of information receivers on participation in the training separately 
for non-purchase and purchase households, since we did not set the control group for the latter. To examine 
the determinants of training participation for non-purchase households, we run the following regression 
equation by OLS:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑊𝑇𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽𝐻𝑇𝐻𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
ℎ𝛾ℎ + 𝑋𝑖
𝐻𝛾𝐻 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑊𝛾𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖 is either an indicator variable for participation of wife from household i or an indicator variable 
for participation of husband from household i, TW (TH) takes 1 if a married wife (husband) of household 
i is assigned to receive the letter and zero otherwise, and 𝜀𝑖 is an error term. Because the randomized 
distribution of the letters ensures that the treatment indicators (TW and TH) and 𝜀𝑖 are orthogonal in 
theory, the OLS estimates will provide an unbiased estimator for the ITT effects. In this specification, the 
ITT effect of the letter given to wife (husband) is captured by 𝛽𝑊 (𝛽𝐻). We test whether 𝛽𝑊 = 𝛽𝐻 holds 
to evaluate the extent of information sharing within the household, since the likelihood of participation 
by, say, wife should not be affected by who received the letter under the assumption of complete 
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information sharing among spouses.  
  𝑋𝑖
ℎ is a set of baseline household characteristics that may predict the likelihood of participation in 
training. These covariates include household size, total area of land owned, total value of household assets 
such as livestock and durables, and the indicator variable for previous experience in rice cultivation before 
2018. As the survey villages were spread across five agricultural extension camps, we included camp 
fixed effects. 𝑋𝑖
𝐻 is a set of baseline characteristics of the husband from household i, while 𝑋𝑖
𝑊 is the 
exact same set of controls but for the wife from household i. Spousal characteristics used for the analysis 
are presented in Table 2.  
  Since randomization was done at the household level, one concern is information spillover to the 
control group that would contaminate the true treatment effects. To deal with this empirical concern, we 
exploit randomly-determined treatment intensities per village by controlling for the number of other 
treatment households in the same village in all the regressions.5) 
  For the purchase households, we specify the model as  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑊𝑇𝑊𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
ℎ𝛾ℎ + 𝑋𝑖
𝐻𝛾𝐻 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑊𝛾𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
In this specification, 𝛽𝑊 measures the relative propensity to participate in the training session when the 
wife receives the letter compared to when the husband does so.  
  2) Results 
Figure 1 reports participation rates across treatment statuses. There are three main findings. First, 
information recipients are more likely to join the training than non-recipients, irrespective of purchase 
                                                          
5) In fact, possible spillover effects from treatment to control households turn out not to be a great concern in this context 
for the following two reasons. First, as will be seen in Figure 1, participation rates are negligible for the control group. 
Second, the coefficients on the number of the other treatment households in the same village are never significant 
across all the regressions. However, we observed that 44 participants were from non-survey households, indicating 
the presence of information spillovers from our treatment households to non-survey households that were interested 
in rice cultivation. 
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history and gender of participants. Second, we found evidence of intra-household information spillovers 
on the recipient’s spouses for some purchase households. In particular, 19% of husbands also took part in 
the training when their wives were informed. While there were 17 households from which both spouses 
showed up at the demonstration site, 11 households were from the category TW_P. Finally, control 
households rarely joined the training session, suggesting that the information about the training did not 
flow from the treatment households.  
  These basic patterns are also confirmed even after controlling for household and spousal baseline 
characteristics. Regression results for purchase households are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
3. Results show that wives are more likely to take part in the training by 31 percentage points when they 
are assigned to receive the letter than when their husbands are targeted. While the magnitude is not so 
large due to intra-household information spillovers from the informed spouse to the other, the difference 
in the likelihood of husbands’ participation between the two treatment groups is also statistically 
significant (column 2). Finally, the equality between the coefficients on TW and TH was strongly 
rejected for non-purchase households (columns 3 and 4). These results would not be observed if 
information were shared well within the household. Overall, we found evidence that to whom 
information about training was targeted results in different impacts on participation rates. 
 
4．Heterogeneity by dambo management 
  This section explores the mechanism behind the empirical pattern of sample farmers’ participation in 
training. The observed incomplete information sharing suggests the possibility of strategic information 
withholding by information recipients. What is the conflict of interest among spouses? We also found 
evidence of intra-household information sharing for some purchase households. What is the condition for 
information sharing to happen within the household? 
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  Our companion paper highlights the importance of the identity of dambo managers in explaining 
household demand for rice seeds (Miura, Kijima and Sakurai 2020). In the survey area, management 
rights over plots are individualized, and a good number of wives also have the authority to choose which 
crop to grow for agricultural fields. The intra-household allocations of management rights over plots are 
determined and fixed at marriage. Miura, Kijima, and Sakurai (2020) show that the impact of who 
received monetary incentives in the form of transportation voucher between villages and a miller on rice 
seed take-up depends on who controls dambo plots within the household. More precisely, voucher 
recipients did not fully take advantage of it for fear of increasing the bargaining position of their spouses 
who manage suitable lands for rice production (i.e., dambo). The same logic can be applied to our 
empirical context. If the information recipient does not have any control over the dambo, they would not 
take part in the training. Rather, they may have an incentive to conceal the relevant information from the 
spouse. 
  This possibility is explored by including the interaction terms between our treatment and the gender of 
the dambo plot manager. Table 4 presents the estimation results. For the purchase households in columns 
(1) – (3), the reference category is TH households that do not own any dambo fields. We find that when 
wives receive the letter, their likelihood of participation is relatively high regardless of dambo
management patterns. On the contrary, the pattern of husbands’ participation differs with the gender of 
dambo managers (column 2). Since intra-household allocation of management rights over dambo would 
be endogenous to participation behavior, we compare the results within households in which the 
husband/wife manages dambo. When the husband manages dambo, the impact of the letter to wives is 
smaller by 28 (-0.073-0.202) percentage points than the impact of the letter to husbands. Since this 
difference was statistically significant at the 10% level, the information is less likely to share from the 
wife to the husband in such households. If the wife chooses what to cultivate on dambo, husbands were 
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more likely to attend the training session by 27 (-0.073+0.339) percentage points when the wife was 
informed than when the husband was informed. The difference was also statistically significant at the 
10% level. Thus, the observed information spillovers from the wife to the husband were happening for 
such households. As a result, the fraction of households in which no family member joined the training 
was the highest when the husband received information about the training and the wife managed 
productive plots for rice cultivation (column 3). In such households, information sharing among spouses 
was particularly distorted. This differential impact by the gender of information recipients can also be 
seen for non-purchase households in which the wife controls dambo (-0.142+0.018 vs. -0.138-0.303 in 
column 6).  
 
5. Conclusion 
Although African women often have an individual right to make agricultural decisions, they may have 
limited access to decision-relevant information and managerial know-how under the current extension 
system. This study presents evidence that information does not flow well within the household. While the 
existing practice for most agricultural extension programs is to target household heads (and hence 
typically males), our findings suggest that direct targeting may be required to ensure that individuals who 
need information actually receive it. 
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Figure 1. Participation rates by treatment status 
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(1) (2) t-test
TW_P TH_P p-value
Variable Mean/SD Mean/SD (1)-(2)
# of other treatment HHs in the same village 16.13 15.77 0.82
[10.49] [8.91]
family size 6.37 6.67 0.43
[2.46] [2.09]
land size (ha) 3.86 3.28 0.30
[3.64] [3.26]
value of assets (K1000) 5.41 4.80 0.54
[6.45] [6.16]
=1 if grown rice in last 10 years 0.08 0.09 0.72
[0.27] [0.29]
age, wife 44.00 38.96 0.01***
[12.20] [11.24]
age, husb 51.08 45.69 0.01**
[13.65] [12.48]
years of education, wife 6.00 6.43 0.34
[2.63] [2.84]
years of education, husb 7.42 7.37 0.91
[2.82] [2.88]
non-farm income (K1000/year), wife 0.65 0.58 0.87
[3.73] [1.63]
non-farm income (K1000/year), husb 2.90 1.68 0.05**
[4.55] [2.81]
risk preference, wife 0.71 0.70 0.76
[0.21] [0.27]
risk preference, husb 0.68 0.73 0.20
[0.27] [0.20]
financial autonomy (K100), wife 0.62 0.68 0.67
[0.78] [0.97]
financial autonomy (K100), husb 0.74 0.99 0.13
[0.80] [1.13]
pre-demand in kg, wife 4.81 3.92 0.07*
[3.25] [2.76]
pre-demand in kg, husb 5.24 4.76 0.33
[3.10] [3.07]
=1 if wife manages dambo 0.13 0.08 0.33
[0.34] [0.27]
=1 if husband manages dambo 0.40 0.43 0.72
[0.49] [0.50]
N 78 75
Table 1. Balance test for purchase households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: HH (husb) stands for household (husband). Entries in the last column are p-values from the t-test for equality 
across treatment status. The index for financial autonomy was created based on the following question: “How much can 
you spend at one time without consulting your spouse?” The options are “less than K10,” “K10-K30,” “K30-K50,” “K50-
K100,” “K100-K300,” “K300-K500,” and “more than K500.” We use the intermediate value for each option as a proxy 
for financial autonomy. Risk preference parameters are elicited from a Binswanger-style hypothetical game. A higher 
value indicates more risk averse. 
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(1) (2) (3) F-test
TW_NP TH_NP C_NP for joint
Variable Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD orthogonality
# of other treatment HHs in the same village 15.06 15.68 16.49 0.66
[10.03] [10.85] [11.61]
family size 5.43 5.29 5.49 0.76
[1.92] [1.80] [2.07]
land size (ha) 2.80 2.23 3.13 0.14
[3.55] [2.10] [3.71]
value of assets (K1000) 3.22 2.43 2.97 0.63
[8.85] [2.40] [4.42]
=1 if grown rice in last 10 years 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.86
[0.24] [0.27] [0.24]
age, wife 37.45 38.40 38.86 0.75
[12.85] [13.45] [13.14]
age, husb 43.02 43.83 44.44 0.79
[13.92] [14.41] [14.75]
years of education, wife 6.05 6.03 5.58 0.45
[3.03] [2.89] [2.86]
years of education, husb 7.11 7.53 6.97 0.42
[3.31] [2.96] [2.97]
non-farm income (K1000/year), wife 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.96
[1.20] [1.55] [1.17]
non-farm income (K1000/year), husb 2.21 2.54 2.34 0.87
[3.77] [4.28] [5.01]
risk preference, wife 0.73 0.68 0.73 0.38
[0.26] [0.30] [0.26]
risk preference, husb 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.79
[0.28] [0.26] [0.25]
financial autonomy (K100), wife 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.85
[0.90] [0.99] [0.81]
financial autonomy (K100), husb 0.66 0.72 0.71 0.84
[0.87] [0.72] [0.70]
pre-demand in kg, wife 3.66 4.23 4.57 0.09*
[2.61] [2.84] [3.10]
pre-demand in kg, husb 4.43 4.38 4.69 0.74
[2.75] [2.97] [3.23]
=1 if wife manages dambo 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.69
[0.28] [0.26] [0.31]
=1 if husband manages dambo 0.22 0.30 0.26 0.43
[0.42] [0.46] [0.44]
N 95 99 95
Table 2. Balance test for non-purchase households  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: HH (husb) stands for household (husband). Entries in the last column are p-values from the F-test for equality 
across treatment status. 
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Table 3. ITT estimates for the determinants of participation  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Variables presented in Table 1 
and camp fixed effects are included but not reported. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wife joined husb joined wife joined husb joined
TW 0.314*** -0.127* 0.140*** 0.018
(0.068) (0.073) (0.038) (0.027)
TH -0.002 0.186***
(0.021) (0.045)
TW=TH (p-value) . . 0.00 0.00
Sample Purchase HH Purchase HH Non-purchase HH Non-purchase HH
Ref. category's mean of dep. var. 0.08 0.33 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R squared 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.11
N 153 153 289 289
17 
 
Table 4. ITT impacts by dambo management 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wife joined husb joined no one joined wife joined husb joined no one joined
TW=1 0.242** -0.073 -0.047 0.124*** 0.028 -0.142***
(0.111) (0.103) (0.129) (0.040) (0.033) (0.048)
TW=1 # wife manages dambo=1 0.188 0.339* -0.437** -0.030 -0.003 0.018
(0.206) (0.181) (0.213) (0.099) (0.066) (0.111)
TW=1 # husband manages dambo=1 0.124 -0.202 0.021 0.084 -0.051 -0.083
(0.150) (0.152) (0.181) (0.103) (0.053) (0.106)
TH=1 0.002 0.150*** -0.138**
(0.025) (0.055) (0.057)
TH=1 # wife manages dambo=1 0.002 0.274 -0.303
(0.047) (0.198) (0.201)
TH=1 # husband manages dambo=1 -0.008 0.043 -0.093
(0.060) (0.096) (0.102)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.131 -0.295*** 0.422*** -0.003 -0.030 0.031
(0.112) (0.106) (0.123) (0.029) (0.053) (0.064)
husband manages dambo=1 -0.037 0.175 -0.099 0.017 -0.001 0.024
(0.092) (0.112) (0.121) (0.044) (0.049) (0.056)
Sample purchase HH purchase HH purchase HH non-purchase HH non-purchase HH non-purchase HH
Adjusted R squared 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13
N 153 153 153 289 289 289
